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Abstract. The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between government spending and private consumption in 
the UK, for which there is scarce previous empirical evidence. We disaggregate public expenditure into three categories and 
search for the corresponding private consumption multipliers. Our analysis includes the estimation of a structural vector error 
correction model, using quarterly non-interpolated data for the period 1981:1 – 2007:4. Initially, we estimate negative (and 
barely significant) effects on consumption of shocks to total public spending. Then, using the spending breaking down, we 
find that while shocks to public wages crowd-out private consumption as predicted by neoclassical models, shocks to the 
non-systematic component of social spending and government purchases of goods and services generate a positive reaction, 
so  to  crowd-in  private  consumption.  Thus,  the  qualitative  and  quantitative  dimensions  of  fiscal  multipliers  on  private 
consumption  change  across  different  public  spending  categories.  Our  findings  suggest  that  any  empirical  support  of 
competing theoretical  models on  the issue  would benefit  from a disaggregation of  government expenditure, rather than 
focusing on the aggregate measure.  
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1. Introduction 
At the beginning of 2009, when the need to implement an unprecedented increase in public spending to 
counteract the global recession became clear, a common question among policy makers and Treasury 
Departments all over the world was the following: which part of public expenditure should we privilege 
in order to maximize the positive effect on private demand? Two years later, as the agenda is dominated 
by the need of fiscal retrenchment, the question is reversed: what should be cut first in order not to 
dampen the recovery? In both cases, the issue to be addressed is the same: finding the public expenditure 
category associated with the highest consumption multiplier. Attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of 
fiscal policy often rely on the appraisal of the sign and magnitude of public expenditure’s impact either 
on GDP (e.g. Blanchard and Perotti 2002), or private consumption (e.g. García and Ramajo 2005), or on 
private investment (e.g. Wang 2005). In our paper we investigate the private consumption multiplier 
associated  not  only  with  aggregate  government  spending,  but  also  with  each  of  its  three  different 
components, namely wage, non-wage and social security expenditures (see Figure 1).  
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
These three spending categories differ in many respects, so it is reasonably plausible to hypothesize 
different qualitative and quantitative impacts on private consumption. The fundamental motivation of 
our work is the belief that a focus on the aggregate measure of public spending, rather than on a more 
accurate  disaggregation,  might  imply  inaccurate  policy  conclusions  on  its  stimulating  role  (if  any). 
Particularly, we explicitly consider government social expenditure as a spending category per se, rather 
than including it into the revenue component as usually done in the literature. The rationale for that 
relies in our desire to verify the consumption-enhancing properties of income redistribution, which is 
implemented through the net social security transfers. 
Our empirical analysis is based on a structural vector error correction (SVEC) model using UK quarterly 
non-interpolated data (1981:Q1 -2007:Q4). At the moment the evidence on this country is scarce, as 
only  few  studies  have  employed  UK  data  (Perotti  2004  and  2007, Ramos  and  Roca-Sagales  2008, 
Monacelli  and Perotti  2010).  Moreover –  as  all of them adopted VAR estimations  - none of them 
addressed the cointegrating properties of the series under investigation. In particular, for the period 1981-2001, Monacelli and Perotti (2010) find mixed results on the effects of government spending on 
private consumption, with positive effects when using the GDP deflator and negative effects when using 
own  deflators.
1  Investigating a similar period, Perotti (2004) finds that the cumulated response of 
consumption to a 1% of GDP government spending shock after three years is merely +.05% of GDP. 
Finally,  with  data  up  to  2005,  Ramos  and  Roca -Sagales  (2008)  find  that  government  spending 
negatively affects GDP.
2 Our aim is to shed light on these few (and mixed) results  analyzing UK data 
using a methodology which innovates in several aspects.  First of all, we investigate public spending 
using both its aggregate measure and each of its components. This marks a difference with what has 
been done in the literature so far (Beetsma et al. 2006 and 2008, Giordano et al. 2007, Cavallo 2005 and 
2007), as we explicitly consider net social security spending in the analysis instead of including it into 
the net taxes variable. Then, we use a cointegrating framework that permits to extract information from 
the series under investigation taking into account their long run properties , in a spirit close to Krusec 
(2003) who estimated a SVEC model of fiscal policy using US data. Differently from him, we include 
public debt in the model, following Favero and Giavazzi (2007). 
Our results show that shocks to aggregate public spending negatively affect private consumption, even if 
the estimates are barely statistically different from zero at standard levels. Looking at the effects of the 
three  components  of public spending, we find that  shocks  to  both  net  social  security  transfers and 
government  “pure”  consumption  (purchases  of  goods  and  services)  result  in  positive  responses  of 
private consumption. While the response to the first shock lasts four years, the response to the second 
shock dies out within six quarters. On the other hand, shocks to public wages negatively affect private 
consumption, with effects that die out less than two years after the shock. These results support the 
intuition that using total government spending does not seem to be a reasonable simplification when 
studying the effects of public spending on private consumption.  
We believe these results to be relevant for the theoretical debate between alternative and competing 
approaches  modelling  private  consumption’s  impact  of  fiscal  shocks.  In  particular,  the  standard 
neoclassical real business cycle (RBC) model predicts a fall in consumption following a government 
                                                 
1 In fact, the consumption impulse responses show that, even when using the GDP deflator, the cumulated response of private 
consumption is circa zero 16 quarters after the public spending shock (ten quarters after the shock  the effects become 
negative, similarly to what Perotti 2007 finds investigating a larger time span). 
2 There are other studies of the UK fiscal policy (e.g. Sawyer 2007, Budd 2010), but their scopes are different from the one of 
quantifying the effects of public spending on GDP or on some components of aggregate demand. 4 
 
spending shock, because of the Ricardian equivalence: higher public spending must be matched by an 
equivalent increase in taxation in present discounted terms. Thus, intertemporal optimizing consumers 
suffer from a negative wealth effect that decreases consumption (with positive effects on output due to 
the increased labour supply triggered by the wealth effect). Since virtually no study seems to confirm the 
prediction of the standard neoclassical model (as pointed out by Galí et al. 2007), New Keynesian 
economists attempted to reconcile theory with empirical evidence by rescuing a consumption-enhancing 
role for fiscal policy. This has been accomplished either using finite-horizons frameworks (Blanchard 
1985) or introducing credit-constrained agents and rule-of-thumb consumers (Mankiw 2000, Galí et al. 
2004 and 2007, Coenen and Straub 2005).3 Above all, this latter approach has gained considerable 
attention. It assumes that there is a fraction of non -Ricardian households who do not optimize over the 
life cycle and are thus forced to consume out of current income, so that their consumption responds 
promptly to a fiscal policy impulse.4 A further research strand explicitly considers the per se government 
expenditure’s  impact  on  consumption.  This  is  often  carried  out  by  an  ad-hoc  utility  function 
specification where private and public consumption are entered in a non-additive form, so to obtain a 
non-zero impact of one on the marginal utility of the other (Bouakez and Rebei 2003).  
Our study can be relevant for all the above-mentioned theoretical discussions. We provide evidence that 
considering  aggregate  government  spending  can  indeed  be  misleading.  The  identification  of  social 
expenditure and pure consumption as the sole expenditure categories which are effective in stimulating 
private consumption leads to two remarks. First, the complementarity/substitutability issue cannot be 
discussed independently from a sufficient disaggregation of government spending. Second, the rule-of 
thumb-consumers  approach  can  indeed  be  justified  no  longer  on  the  assumption  of  an  exogenous 
fraction of credit constrained agents. For instance, it could be hypothesized that the consumption of the 
beneficiaries of social security transfers (presumably lying in the lower part of income distribution) is 
                                                 
3 As a matter of fact, there are also alternative ways to the same result. Ravn et al. (2004) obtain a positive effect on 
consumption without credit-constrained agents, but assuming that the representative individual forms consumption habits on 
the individual variety in a monopolistic competition setting, rather than on aggregate consumption. Corsetti et al. (2009) use 
spending reversals to get a positive response of private consumption to government spending shocks. 
4 As discussed by Galí et al. (2007), the presence of non-Ricardian consumers must be coupled with sticky prices and 
imperfectly competitive markets in order to obtain a private consumption’s positive response. stimulated  by  at  least  one  component  of  public  spending,  thus  the  rule-of-thumb  models  could  be 
parameterized accordingly.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theory behind the SVEC 
methodology. Section 3 contains the estimates of the VEC model. Section 4 deals with the structural 
analysis (identification assumptions and impulse response analysis). Section 5 concludes and discusses 
some policy implications. 
 
2. The SVEC methodology 
The literature that investigates the effects of public spending on private consumption and output has 
largely used structural VAR models since the seminal article by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) on the US 
economy. In our paper we use a closely related technique: a SVEC model that takes into account the 
cointegrating properties of the series under investigation. The analysis starts from a reduced form VEC 
model: 
'
1 1 1 1 1 ... , t t t p t p t t y y y y D u                  (2.1) 
where yt is a Kx1 vector of time series, Dt is a vector of deterministic terms, and Γ1, ..., Γp-1 are KxK 
coefficient matrices. The reduced form disturbance (forecast error) ut is a Kx1 unobservable zero mean 
white  noise  process  with  covariance  matrix  Σu.  α  and  β  are  Kxr  matrices  containing  the  loading 
coefficients and the r cointegrating vectors, respectively. We are interested in the effects of fundamental 
shocks εt (error terms of the structural form VEC model) on the system variables yt.. The link between 
the two errors is given by the contemporaneous impact matrix A: 
tt uA     (2.2) 
In order to analyze the effects of the underlying structural shocks we need to identify the A matrix, by 
recovering its K
2 elements. Assuming that the structural shocks are uncorrelated and have unit variances 
(Σε=Ik) we get: 
' ' ' '
u t t t t E uu E A A AA                   (2.3) 
The symmetry of Σε and the normalization of the structural variances impose K(K+1)/2 restrictions on 
the K
2  parameters of A. Therefore, to exactly identify the elements of A, we need to impose K(K-1)/2 6 
 
additional  linearly  independent  restrictions.  We  prefer  to  impose  long  run  restrictions  rather  than 
contemporaneous  restrictions,  which  are  usually  harder  to  justify  even  with  quarterly  data.  From 
Granger's  representation  theorem  (Johansen,  1995)  it  follows  that  the  long  run  effects  of  structural 
shocks εt can be written as:  
  1, CA   (2.4) 
where C(1) is the total impact matrix computed as: 





K i i CI    


          (2.5) 
β┴ and α┴ represent the orthogonal complements of β and α respectively. Note that C(1) has reduced 
rank rk(C(1))=K-r. Long run restrictions can now be imposed by setting elements of (2.4). As in the 
common trends literature (e.g. see King et al. 1991), we distinguish between permanent and transitory 
effects. Setting elements of (2.4) to zero and replacing C(1) by an estimator obtained from the reduced 
form, the restrictions may be written in implicit form as: 
       
* ˆˆ (1) (1) 0, l l k l Rvec C A R I xC vec A R vec A      (2.6) 
where  Rl  is  an  appropriate  restriction  matrix.  These  long  run  restrictions  can  be  combined  with 
contemporaneous restrictions on the elements of A. With enough identifying restrictions, estimates of 
the  contemporaneous  impact  matrix  can  be  found  by  maximizing  the  concentrated  log-likelihood 
function with respect to the free structural parameters (see e.g. Breitung et al. 2004). Concentrating the 
log-likelihood with respect to the reduced form parameters is no longer possible if additional restrictions 
for  α,  Γ1,  ...,  Γp-1  are  imposed.  Nevertheless,  residuals  from  a  subset  VEC  model  may  still  give  a 
reasonable estimate of Σu (Hamilton, 1994). Thus, the same estimation technique as before can be used 
to form reasonable estimates for A. 
Based on this discussion, the econometric analysis of the UK fiscal policy effects will be the following: 
first,  we  determine  the  cointegration  rank  of  the  system  of  interest,  imposing  over-identifying 
restrictions on the cointegrating vectors using the Johansen (1995) method. These cointegrating relations 
are used to setup a full VEC model, where no further restrictions are imposed. Residuals from the full 
and  subset  VEC  model  are  used  to  form  estimates  for  Σu.  Second,  long  run  and  contemporaneous restrictions are used to form estimates of A. Using the estimated contemporaneous impact matrix, we 
recover the structural shocks and we analyze their impact through an impulse response analysis.  
 
3. Analysis of UK public expenditure 
The present section opens our empirical analysis on the UK economy. Particularly, it is concerned with 
the description and discussion of the dataset  (subsection  3.1), the investigation of  the cointegrating 
properties (subsection 3.2), and the estimation of the VEC model (subsection 3.3). 
3.1 Data description 
“The availability of quarterly fiscal variables represents the main constraint for the analysis of fiscal 
policy with VAR models” (Giordano et al. 2007, p. 710). Furthermore, Perotti (2004) correctly warns 
against the distortions coming from the usage of quarterly data set obtained by interpolation of yearly 
values. This remark makes the data availability constraint even more binding, and poses considerable 
limitations to the implementation of a fully-equipped large scale time series analysis. We have chosen to 
sacrifice  the  generality  of  our  empirical  results  in  favour  of  a  complete  non-interpolated  quarterly 
dataset. We use UK data from the first quarter of 1981 to the last quarter of 2007 taken from the OECD 
Economic  Outlook  no.  83.5  We  use  the  following  variables:  the  log  of  real  government  wage 
expenditure GWt, the log of real government net social security spending (cyclically adjusted) GSSt, the 
log of real government spending in goods and services GCt, the log of real government consumption 
(calculated as the sum of the three previous variables), the log of real total government consumption, 
GTOTt, the log of real taxes (cyclically adjusted) Tt, the log of real private consumption Ct, and the log 
of real government net financial liabilities Bt. The time series are shown in Figure 2. The details on the 
construction of the fiscal variables used in the system and some descriptive statistics are given in the 
Appendix. We do not include public investment into the analysis as this component implies external 
effects, such as production externalities, that are not immediately associated with private consumption, 
which is the focus of this paper (see e.g. Mittnik and Neumann 2001). We also do not explicitly consider 
                                                 
5 The quarterly data of the Economic Outlook are normally obtained by interpolation, but not those of the UK. The beginning 
of the period has been chosen because of the strong evidence for a structural break in UK data between 1981 and the previous 
period (Perotti, 2004). 8 
 
tax  shocks,  as  they  are  particularly  hard  to  identify  in  a  SVAR  model  (Perotti,  2007,  Alesina  and 
Ardagna 2009). Also, differently from previous analysis, we do not consider net taxes (revenues minus 
transfers), rather we differentiate between social security contributions and revenues coming both from 
direct and indirect taxes. Both series are cyclically adjusted, since both are likely to be determined by 
the business cycles and we want to control for it. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
3.2 Unit root and cointegration analysis 
This subsection deals with the integration properties of the seven time series. The results of unit root 
tests are reported in Table 1. The standard augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is performed for all the 
series. In all tests the specification of the deterministic term and the lag order are important and may 
determine the test result, as it is usually the case. Therefore, in some cases we report tests for different 
sets  of deterministic terms  and lag orders. The latter are chosen by the Akaike and Hannan-Quinn 
criteria (AIC and HQ respectively, see Lütkepohl, 1991) using a maximum lag order of ten. For the 
results in Table 1 it can be inferred that all the variables are integrated of order one (I(1)).  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The cointegration properties of all the endogenous I(1) variables were investigated by Johansen's trace 
tests (as in, e.g., Pesaran and Shin 2002). They are likelihood ratio (LR) tests based on reduced rank 
regressions of the corresponding VEC models. Suitable critical values depend on the deterministic terms 
included in the test regression (see Johansen, 1995). The test results for different systems of interest in 
the context of our analysis are reported in Table 2. We used the AIC, SC and HQ information criteria 
(the latter two always suggested to use the same number of lags) to determine the lag length of the 
processes, reported in the table. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 The difference among the four systems investigated in Table 2 lies in the public spending variable, 
which in turn is total consumption GTOT, wages GW, net social security spending GSS, and purchases 
of  goods  and  services  GC.  Results  show  that  in  three  of  the  four  systems  there  appear  to  be  two 
cointegrating relationships (all but that including government wages). It is standard to use theoretical 
considerations as a guidance to express meaningful long-run relationships (Lütkepohl and Krätzig 2004, 
Pesaran and Shin 2002): the first relationship is between taxes and both government spending and public 
debt. It arises from the fact that in the long run, when the real stock of government debt is constant, total 
government expenditures including interest payments on the outstanding debt must equal government 
revenues  in  the  form  of  taxes.  The  second  relationship  is  between  private  consumption  and  both 
government spending and public debt. This comes from the standard flexible prices models that imply 
that any change in public spending - and, via the government budget constraint, in the stock of debt - has 
a  long-run  impact  on  private  consumption  through  the  Ricardian  equivalence.  The  increase  in  the 
present value of future taxation triggers a negative wealth effect that decreases private components of 
aggregate  demand.  Finally,  since  there  are  no  theoretical  justifications  to  the  different  number  of 
cointegrating relations in the four investigated systems, we carry out the analysis assuming that the 
cointegrating rank is equal to 2 for all of them. 
 
3.3 VECM estimation results 
The four models  have  been estimated with  the number of lags  chosen so  that at  least  one  year of 
observations was included (i.e. with three lagged differences).
6 LM tests do not indicate the presence of 
residual autocorrelation in the models.  All diagnostics results are reported in the Appendix, t ogether 
with the VECM estimates   which  come from  subset models estimated by  applying the   top-down 
procedure  based on the AIC  (see Brüggemann and Lütkepohl, 2001). The top-down  algorithm  is a 
sequential elimination  procedure  that  minimizes the chosen information criterion by imposing zero 
restrictions so to reduce the number of estimated parameters. 
We  report  the  estimated  cointegrating  matrix  β  in  Table  3  together  with  the  estimated  loading 
coefficients.  
                                                 
6 “The reason for overruling information criteria in the empirical literature and mechanically opting for four lags goes back to 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002). In their paper the goal was to capture seasonal patterns in the collection of taxes by allowing 
for quarter dependence, hence, the four lags” (Hauzenberger, 2010, 8). 10 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Looking  at  the  estimated  cointegrating  relationships,  there  are  few  variables  that  present  different 
estimated signs of their coefficients across the four specifications. As for the first relationship (taxes on 
the  left-hand  side,  government  spending  and  debt  on  the  right-hand  side),  positive  coefficients  are 
associated with debt independently from the type of public spending included. On the other hand, we 
estimate positive coefficients for all the government spending variables with the exception of the one on 
net social security spending. This finding suggests that in our sample the government intertemporal 
budget constraint did not bind in case of social spending (that is, it did not require per se to be backed-up 
by increased revenues). As for the second estimated cointegrating relation (consumption on the left-hand 
side, public spending and debt on the right-hand side), negative coefficients are associated with debt in 
all four models. Again, the net social security spending specification differs from the others, since in this 
case a positive coefficient is associated to public spending, while negative coefficients are estimated in 
the other specifications. We read this peculiarity as indicating the consumption-stimulating role of social 
expenditure. This might be regarded as evidence of the presence of credit-constrained consumers (à la 
Galí et al. 2007) who rely on social transfers to sustain their consumption dynamics. However, we turn 
to the structural analysis in order to understand the (possibly) different effects of the various components 
of public spending. 
 
4. Structural analysis 
In this section we derive identifying restrictions according to the discussion in Section 2 to exactly 
identify the structural shocks. Then, we carry out the analysis using impulse response functions. 
 
4.1 Identification procedure 
From  Section  2  we  know  that  we  need  K(K-1)/2  =  4(4-1)/2  =  6  additional  linearly  independent 
restrictions coming from economic theory to exactly identify the structural shocks. In addition, we know 
from the common trends literature that in a four-dimensional system with two cointegrating relations, only two shocks can have permanent effects. We therefore restrict shocks to Tt and Gt (all of the four 
public spending variables considered, depending on the specification) to have no permanent effects on 
any of the variables of the system, since standard models do not envisage any long-run effects for these 
variables. This implies that shocks εT,t, and εG,t do not have permanent effects on the system variables, 
which can be expressed as zero columns in C(1)A (due to the chosen ordering of the variables: Ct, Tt, Gt, 
Bt): 
 
* 0 0 *
* 0 0 *
(1)
* 0 0 *








  (5.1) 
 
These 8 zero restrictions only corresponds to 4 linearly independent restrictions, due to the reduced rank 
of the matrix. Therefore, we need 2 additional restrictions, 1 of which must be imposed in C(1)A, while 
the other must be included in the contemporaneous relations matrix (Lütkepohl and Krätzig 2004). Thus, 
we  assume  that  consumption  shocks  have  no  long  run  effects  on  debt  and  that  taxes  do  not 
contemporaneously (within the quarter) affect public spending. The reason for the first restriction is that, 
according to the standard steady-state formulation of the government budget constraint, the long run 
value of the debt does not depend on private consumption, but rather on the levels of the primary deficits 
and the real interest rate. 
The  reason  for  assuming  no  contemporaneous  effects  of  tax  shocks  on  government  spending  (the 
restriction in the contemporaneous relations matrix) regards the political economy of budget processing 
(Beetsma  and  Bovenberg  1998)  which  makes  very  unlikely  a  quarterly  revision  of  predetermined 
spending categories on the basis of unexpected movements in tax collection. As a robustness test, we 
tried  a  different  (meaningful)  alternative  zero  contemporaneous  restriction:  we  assumed  no 
contemporaneous effects of government spending on taxes. The results are substantially unaffected, with 
the only effect being a stronger negative response of private consumption to public wages shocks.  
Therefore, the chosen identification strategy can be expressed as follows: 12 
 
* * * * * 0 0 *
* * * * * 0 0 *
, (1)
* 0 * * * 0 0 *
* * * * 0 0 0 *
A C A
   
   
    
   
   
   
    (5.2) 
The four just-identified structural VEC models are estimated with the method illustrated in Section 2 
(see the detailed results in the Appendix, Tables A2-A7). 
 
4.2 Impulse response analysis 
Impulse responses are shown for the four estimated SVEC models. Only public spending shocks are 
considered,  as  they  are  the  main  focus  of  the  analysis.  95%  confidence  intervals  for  the  impulse 
responses are bootstrapped (Breitung et al. 2004) using the percentile method proposed by Hall (1992). 
The  responses  have  to  be  interpreted  as  responses  to  one  standard  deviation  shocks  of  the  public 
spending variable (we report in parenthesis the quantitative effects assuming that shocks are equal to 1% 
of the spending variable below). Figure 3 shows the responses of all the variables of the model to a total 
government spending shock.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Although the response of private consumption is negative (one year cumulative impact: -0.53%), it is 
barely significantly different from zero at standard levels (the 95% confidence interval does not include 
zero for the second quarter after the shock only). We view this result as a confirmation of the previous 
literature findings for the UK, where most estimates are either quantitatively unimportant or negative. 
Note that both Perotti (2004, 2007) and Monacelli and Perotti (2010) use data up to 2000, Ramos and 
Roca-Sagales (2008) up to 2005, while we extend the time period under investigation to the end of 2007. 
We turn now to the analysis of the impulse responses generated by the SVEC models that include the 
three components of public spending separately (see Figures 4-6).  
 
INSERT FIGURES 4-6 ABOUT HERE 
 Government wages shocks negatively affect private consumption with a one-year cumulative impact 
equal to -0.51%. These negative effects die out within six quarters. On the other hand, both government 
consumption and net social security transfers have positive private consumption multipliers, with one-
year cumulative impact equal to, respectively, +0.53% and +0.57%. Particularly, the stimulating role of 
social spending seems to be confirmed by its remarkable persistence, as its effects remain positive and 
significant  up  to  four  years  after  the  initial  shock  (much  longer  than  in  the  case  of  government 
consumption).  
Our  results  seem  to  depict  a  general  framework  featured  by  a  slight  flavour  of  both  old  and New 
Keynesian theories. The fact that the government consumption multiplier is positive and higher than that 
attached to the wage expenditure (which is even negative) seems to confirm the traditional Keynesian 
intuition  on  the  role  played  by  the  marginal  propensity  to  consume  in  determining  the  size  of  the 
different multipliers. Nevertheless, this remark should also imply a lower value of the social spending 
multipliers, being itself an income subsidy and therefore subject to the same “limitations” of the wage 
multiplier, as far as the impact on consumption is concerned. However, a possible explanation of the 
importance and positive sign of the estimated social spending multiplier can be found in one of the more 
recent New Keynesian contributions, namely the rule-of-thumb-consumers approach. As mentioned in 
the introduction, the inclusion of the social expenditure category into the model can help identifying 
more closely the credit-constrained agents, which might actually coincide with the receptors of social 
transfers. Those households, being forced to consume out of their current income (which presumably 
largely relies on social transfers), increase consumption in response to that kind of government spending 
stimulus. On the other hand, the negative sign of the multiplier associated to the wage expenditure lies 
firmly within the RBC approach, which predicts a crowding-out effect of private consumption after a 
government spending stimulus. 
Overall, the results confirm the intuitions about the different roles played by different components of 
public spending: not only the signs of the responses change depending on the analyzed component, but 
also the persistence of the shocks varies across the three different public spending categories. 
5. Conclusions 
Our paper aims at providing a more accurate understanding of the effects of public spending on private 
consumption,  analyzing  the  different  effects  associated  to  three  categories  of  expenditure,  namely 
wages, social security expenditure, and pure consumption. In order to accomplish this task we perform 14 
 
an empirical analysis focused on the UK economy, as previous literature on this country contains scarce 
and ambiguous evidence. We employ a SVEC model with an identification strategy that takes advantage 
of the differentiation between permanent and temporary shocks in the cointegrating framework. Our 
results conform to the previous evidence when using public spending in its aggregate, as we estimate 
negative effects on private consumption which are barely different from zero at standard confidence 
levels (Perotti 2004 and 2007, Ramos and Roca-Sagales 2008, Monacelli and Perotti 2010). Interesting 
insights come from the estimation of the model using the three components of public spending, since we 
find that shocks to both net social security transfers and government pure consumption result in positive 
responses of private consumption. While the response to the first one lasts for a long period of time with 
significant effects up to four years from the shock, the response to the pure consumption shock dies out 
within six quarters. This consumption-enhancing role of fiscal policy is envisaged in New Keynesian 
models. On the other hand, shocks to public wages negatively affect private consumption (as predicted 
by standard RBC models), with effects that die out within two years after the shock. These results 
support the intuition that using total aggregate government expenditure does not seem to be a reasonable 
simplification when studying the effects of public spending on private consumption. While we believe 
that this analysis can represent a useful contribution to a more effective management of fiscal policy 
tools on the expenditure side, the general validity of the findings is certainly limited by the focus on a 
single country. A panel analysis on European Union countries would allow a more complete answer to 
our original question and would probably be the best next step to be taken. 
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Figure 1: The three components of public spending in the UK 
 















Figure 2: The data 
 
Source: OECD quarterly Economic Outlook no. 83, authors' calculations. Figure 3: SVEC impulse responses – total government spending model 
 
Notes: 95% confidence bands are bootstrapped using the Hall method with 500 replications. 
Figure 4: SVEC impulse responses – government wages model 
 
Notes: 95% confidence bands are bootstrapped using the Hall method with 500 replications. 
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Figure 5: SVEC impulse responses – net social security expenditure model 
 
Notes: 95% confidence bands are bootstrapped using the Hall method with 500 replications. 
Figure 6: SVEC impulse responses – government consumption model 
 
Notes: 95% confidence bands are bootstrapped using the Hall method with 500 replications. Tables 
Table 1: Unit root tests for sample period 1981:1 to 2007:4 
Variable  Deterministic terms  Lags  Test statistic  5% crit. value 
GWt  C, T  n(AIC)=n(HQ)=5  -1.3688  -3.41 
ΔGWt  C  n(AIC)=n(HQ)=4  -3.862**  -2.86 
GSSt  C  n(AIC)=5  -2.43  -2.86 
  C  n(HQ)=0  -1.62  -2.86 
ΔGSSt  C  n(AIC)=n(HQ)=0  -10.72**  -2.86 
GCt  C, T, SD  n(AIC)=2  -1.71  -3.41 
  C, T, SD  n(HQ)=1  -1.94  -3.41 
ΔGCt  C, T  n(AIC)=n(HQ)=1  -10.32**  -3.41 
GTOTt  C, T  n(AIC)=8  -3.48*  -3.41 
    n(HQ)=5  -2.9  -3.41 
ΔGTOTt  C  n(AIC)=4  -3.01*  -2.86 
    n(HQ)=0  -12.95**  -2.86 
Tt  C, T  n(AIC)=n(HQ)=1  -1.88  -3.41 
ΔTt  C  n(AIC)=n(HQ)=0  -15.47**  -2.86 
Ct  C, T  n(AIC)=n(HQ)=3  -2.59  -3.41 
ΔCt  C  n(AIC)=2  -3.71**  -2.86 
  C  n(HQ)=1  4.50**  -2.86 
Bt  C  n(AIC)=n(HQ)=1  -1.56  -2.86 
  C, T  n(AIC)=n(HQ)=1  -2.27  -3.41 
ΔBt  C  n(AIC)=n(HQ)=0  -3.56**  -2.86 
Notes: C - constant, T - linear time trend, SD - seasonal dummies. n(AIC) and n(HQ) are the lag orders recommended by the 
AIC  and  HQ  criteria,  respectively,  when  the  maximum  lag  order  is  set  to  8.  ADF  critical  values  from  Davidson  and 









Table 2: Cointegration tests for sample period 1981:1 to 2007:4 
Variables 
Deterministic 
terms  H0 rank  Johansen trace test  5% crit. value 
      n(AIC)  n(HQ)   
GTOTt, Tt, Ct, Bt  C, T, SD  0  90.95***  90.95***  63.66 
    1  45.03**  45.03**  42.77 
    2  20.26  20.26  25.73 
    3  7.46  7.46  12.45 
      [n=2]  [n=2]   
GWt, Tt, Ct, Bt  C, T, SD  0  83.03***  82.21***  63.66 
    1  39.31  39.66  42.77 
    2  12.19  12.81  25.73 
    3  4.09  3.91  12.45 
      [n=3]  [n=2]   
GSSt, Tt, Ct, Bt  C, T, SD  0  94.65***  98.58***  63.66 
    1  51.75***  50.26***  42.77 
    2  20.38  18.87  25.73 
    3  3.96  5.1  12.45 
      [n=3]  [n=2]   
GCt, Tt, Ct, Bt  C, T, SD  0  84.05***  84.05***  63.66 
    1  41.21*  41.21*  42.77 
    2  17.87  17.87  25.73 
    3  7.26  7.26  12.45 
      [n=2]  [n=2]   
Notes: c - constant, t - linear time trend, sd - seasonal dummies. n(AIC) and n(HQ) indicate that the lag orders are chosen by 
the AIC and HQ criterion, respectively, with maximum lag order set to 8. The actual orders are given in brackets underneath 
the test values. *, ** and *** indicate that the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, 






 Table 3. Estimated cointegrating matrix β and loading coefficients 
Specification  Loading coefficients  Fiscal Rules 
  α1C  α1T  α1G  α1B   
  α2C  α2T  α2G  α2B   
G = GTOT  -  -0.33*  -  -0.08**  Tt = 0.19Gt + 0.24***Bt 
  0.00***  -0.22**  0.00***  -0.64***  Ct = -0.12Gt - 0.12***Bt 
G = GW  0.02*  -0.36***  0.04*  -0.08  Tt = 0.67***Gt + 0.26***Bt 
  0.11***  -0.24**  -  -0.60***  Ct = -0.30***Gt - 0.14***Bt 
G = GSS  -  -0.49***  0.04*  0.18***  Tt = -0.41***Gt + 0.31***Bt 
  0.00***  -0.56***  -0.03  -0.18***  Ct = 0.20***Gt - 0.17***Bt 
G = GC  -  -0.35***  -0.03  -  Tt = 0.09Gt + 0.25***Bt 
  0.07**  -0.26***  0.01  -0.53***  Ct = -0.07Gt - 0.12***Bt 

















Variables construction and data sources 
We use UK quarterly data for the period from the first quarter of 1981 to the fourth quarter of 2007. The 
variables are the following, all taken from the OECD Economic Outlook no. 83. 
Government  consumption  GC:  natural  logarithm  of  (government  final  non-wage  consumption 
expenditure  +  general  government  other  current  disbursements)  deflated  by  the  government  final 
consumption expenditure deflator. 
Government  wage  expenditure  GW:  natural  logarithm  of  government  final  wage  consumption 
expenditure deflated by the government final consumption expenditure deflator. 
Government net social security benefits GSS: natural logarithm of cyclically adjusted (social security 
benefits paid by general government + subsidies – social security contributions received by general 
government) deflated by the government final consumption expenditure deflator. 
Total government spending GTOT: natural logarithm of the sum of the three components. 
Taxes: natural logarithm of cyclically adjusted (total direct taxes + total indirect taxes) deflated by the 
GDP deflator. 
Private  consumption  C: natural  logarithm  of  private  final  consumption  expenditure  deflated  by  the 
private final consumption expenditure deflator. 
Government debt B: natural logarithm of general government net financial liabilities deflated by the 
GDP deflator. 
Table A1: some descriptive statistics. 
Variable  No. of obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min. value  Max. value 
GTOT  108  12.601  0.136  12.395  12.843 
GW  108  11.618  0.071  11.526  11.774 
GC  108  11.706  0.239  11.402  12.170 
GSS  108  11.039  0.190  10.550  11.380 
T  108  11.886  0.198  11.541  12.247 
B  108  12.420  0.427  11.660  12.961 
C  108  13.205  0.242  12.792  13.599 
 VECM estimates (four models according to the different public spending variable) 
Table A2: total government spending (GTOT) model 
   ΔCt  ΔTt  ΔGTOTt  ΔBt 
ec1t-1  0.000 (4.561)  -0.224 (-2.117)  0.001 (7.652)  -0.642 (-6.120) 
ec2t-1    -0.325 (-6.102)    -0.080 (-1.727) 
ΔCt-1  0.203 (2.650)    -0.366 (-1.809)  0.644 (2.132) 
ΔCt-2  0.286 (3.875)    -0.985 (-5.163)    
ΔCt-3      -0.335 (-1.713)    
ΔTt-1  0.055 (3.029)  -0.308 (-4.070)  -0.083 (-1.819)    
ΔTt-2          
ΔTt-3      -0.126 (-2.760)    
ΔGTOTt-1      -0.416 (-4.768)  -0.159 (-1.432) 
ΔGTOTt-2  -0.093 (-2.985)    -0.258 (-3.041)    
ΔGTOTt-3  -0.144 (-4.607)        
ΔBt-1  0.088 (3.780)  -0.152 (-1.681)    0.574 (7.336) 
ΔBt-2  -0.056 (-2.353)        
ΔBt-3     -0.287 (-3.147)     -0.043 (-0.558) 
















Table A3: government wages (GW) model 
   ΔCt  ΔTt  ΔGWt  ΔBt 
ec1t-1  0.111 (4.076)  -0.236 (-2.536)    -0.600 (-6.725) 
ec2t-1  0.021 (1.666)  -0.359 (-6.477)  0.038 (1.705)  -0.075 (-1.581) 
ΔCt-1      0.443 (2.138)  0.779 (2.692) 
ΔCt-2  0.181 (2.049)        
ΔCt-3      -0.480 (-2.524)    
ΔTt-1  0.041 (2.145)  -0.322 (-4.263)  -0.076 (-1.542)  0.091 (1.451) 
ΔTt-2      -0.077 (-1.441)    
ΔTt-3      -0.065 (-1.305)  -0.111 (-1.789) 
ΔGWt-1      -0.558 (-6.674)    
ΔGWt-2  -0.069 (-2.120)    -0.442 (-5.174)    
ΔGWt-3  -0.063 (-1.967)  -0.191 (-1.558)  -0.320 (-3.850)  0.261 (2.593) 
ΔBt-1  0.113 (4.190)  -0.159 (-1.794)    0.591 (7.991) 
ΔBt-2  -0.030 (-1.138)        
ΔBt-3     -0.289 (-3.189)     -0.075 (-0.984) 















 Table A4: government net social security spending (GSS) model 
   ΔCt  ΔTt  ΔGSSt  ΔBt 
ec1t-1  0.000 (3.938)  -0.541 (-5.938)  -0.034 (-1.581)  -0.178 (-7.753) 
ec2t-1    -0.494 (-7.171)  0.040 (1.772)  0.181 (7.758) 
ΔCt-1  0.195 (2.429)    -2.147 (-3.221)    
ΔCt-2  0.253 (3.272)  0.643 (1.794)  -2.792 (-4.269)    
ΔCt-3      -1.559 (-2.410)    
ΔTt-1  0.049 (2.601)  -0.229 (-2.979)      
ΔTt-2          
ΔTt-3      -0.572 (-3.825)  -0.135 (-2.284) 
ΔGSSt-1    0.057 (1.342)  -0.295 (-3.324)  -0.087 (2.532) 
ΔGSSt-2  -0.026 (-2.645)    -0.229 (-2.726)  -0.056 (-1.678) 
ΔGSSt-3  -0.028 (-2.866)        
ΔBt-1  0.097 (3.959)      0.530 (9.521) 
ΔBt-2  -0.061 (-2.504)        
ΔBt-3     -0.349 (-4.066)       
















Table A5: government purchases of goods and services (GC) model 
   ΔCt  ΔTt  ΔGCt  ΔBt 
ec1t-1  0.066 (2.425)  -0.252 (-2.537)  0.028 (2.348)  -0.532 (-6.395) 
ec2t-1    -0.348 (-6.637)  -0.055 (-2.271)    
ΔCt-1  0.166 (1.906)      0.591 (2.063) 
ΔCt-2  0.225 (2.634)    -0.566 (-1.928)    
ΔCt-3          
ΔTt-1  0.052 (2.748)  -0.315 (-4.217)      
ΔTt-2          
ΔTt-3          
ΔGCt-1      -0.429 (-4.732)    
ΔGCt-2      -0.223 (-2.475)    
ΔGCt-3  -0.061 (-2.847)        
ΔBt-1  0.112 (4.298)  -0.163 (-1.831)    0.599 (10.203) 
ΔBt-2  -0.064 (-2.593)        
ΔBt-3             
Notes: t-ratios in parenthesis. Estimates for deterministic terms (C, T, SD) not reported. 
 
Table A6: diagnostics 
   Portmanteau test (24 lags)  LM test for autocorrelation 
     1 lag  2 lags  4 lags  8 lags 
GTOT model  0.768  0.973  0.941  0.913  0.534 
GW model  0.453  0.862  0.913  0.368  0.112 
GSS model  0.684  0.889  0.802  0.705  0.836 
GC model  0.923  0.976  0.997  0.89  0.628 






 Table A7: estimated A and C(1)A matrices 
Matrix A  Matrix C(1)A 
C  T  GTOT  B  C  T  GTOT  B 
0.001 (3.220)  0.000 (-0.811)  0.000 (3.559)  -0.005 (-1.080)  -0.000 (-6.051)  0  0  -0.008 (-1.079) 
-0.002 (-0.910)  0.021 (8.837)  0.011 (2.284)  -0.001 (-0.321)  0.002 (6.051)  0  0  0.016 (1.079) 
0.013 (6.787)  0  0.000 (3.884)  0.003 (0.889)  0.009 (6.051)  0  0  0.008 (1.052) 
0.000 (0.160)  0.005 (1.721)  -0.019 (-7.205)  0.002 (0.960)  0  0  0  0.061 (1.079) 
Matrix A  Matrix C(1)A 
C  T  GW  B  C  T  GW  B 
0.001 (1.859)  -0.003 (-2.313)  -0.001 (-0.942)  0.005 (2.548)  0.002 (2.625)  0  0  0.010 (2.118) 
-0.006 (-1.418)  0.006 (2.153)  -0.021 (-2.427)  0.001 (0.164)  -0.004 (-2.625)  0  0  -0.018 (-2.109) 
-0.014 (-2.705)  0  0.003 (1.844)  0.002 (1.205)  -0.006 (-2.625)  0  0  0.004 (1.820) 
0.001 (0.222)  0.015 (3.637)  0.008 (1.860)  0.009 (2.309)  0  0  0  -0.078 (-2.150) 
Matrix A  Matrix C(1)A 
C  T  GSS  B  C  T  GSS  B 
0.003 (6.524)  0.000 (-2.368)  0.000 (-1.629)  -0.005 (-0.810)  0.003 (7.859)  0  0  -0.006 (-0.817) 
-0.002 (-1.071)  0.022 (9.158)  -0.005 (-1.546)  -0.002 (-0.611)  -0.006 (-7.859)  0  0  0.011 (0.816) 
0.038 (9.383)  0  0.004 (1.940)  0.024 (0.757)  0.015 (7.859)  0  0  0.045 (0.804) 
-0.003 (-1.276)  0.001 (0.242)  0.018 (1.957)  0.000 (0.228)  0  0  0  0.094 (0.812) 
Matrix A  Matrix C(1)A 
C  T  GC  B  C  T  GC  B 
0.000 (0.780)  -0.002 (-2.075)  0.002 (1.903)  0.005 (1.333)  0.001 (0.852)  0  0  0.010 (1.487) 
0.008 (0.859)  0.011 (3.995)  0.019 (3.777)  -0.001 (-0.486)  -0.001 (-0.852)  0  0  -0.020 (-1.489) 
-0.022 (-0.847)  0  0.005 (2.436)  0.001 (0.180)  -0.015 (-0.852)  0  0  -0.005 (-1.095) 
-0.004 (-0.875)  0.014 (6.386)  -0.012 (-3.129)  0.006 (1.762)  0  0  0  -0.078 (-1.494) 
Notes: t-ratios in parenthesis. Standard errors are bootstrapped (500 replications). 
  